You Really Aren't Helping

The curious case of the You're Not Helping (YNH) blog (now defunct, so I can't link to it) highlights a particular sort of human irrational behaviour. It starts from a good intention, I think, but is derailed by simple lack of reasoning.

For a recent history of YNH, this post from The Buddha Is Not Serious gives a good breakdown, in more ways than one. You're Not Helping is a blog started by a faitheist; that is, an atheist who sees value in faith or, at least, that some respect for their beliefs is in order. Even more particularly, a faitheist thinks that some atheist behaviour (typically labelled 'new atheist') is driving a wedge between 'moderate' theists and the rest of rational society. Their complaint is obviously not about the arguments put forward by the new atheists - I show in this post how their arguments are in fact the same ones put forward by the old atheists - and the faitheist is an atheist so presumably must concur. No, their complaint is about the tone; they think a better tone will achieve better results, politically, I think.

Tone is important, we know. Russell Blackford writes intelligently about it here. But it's not all-important. Further, it's not evident that one tone is always the right tone to deliver an argument. I like to think I'm quite reasonable when putting forward my point of view, but I dare say some would call me strident, and others would call me soft on the faithful, depending on their own stridency. I don't see that as a problem. I would encourage a variety of tone for the delivery of these arguments.

The faitheist position is that the tone adopted by the new atheists is unhelpful, and therefore they should not use that tone or, failing that, be silent. There are a number of problems with this:

1) There seems to be no evidence presented to support their hypothesis - it's just common sense, they think.

2) They fail to demonstrate that there is a way of delivering the atheist message without falling foul of the 'tone' accusation. Massimo Pigliucci is a leading faitheist, whose philosophical writing I've often admired, but hilariously is accused here of failing in the tone wars himself ("Tone matters. And sarcasm is not science."). Should he tell himself to be quiet?

3) And finally, their commentaries on the new atheists adopt the same snark and sarcasm that they are demanding the new atheists remove from their commentaries on theism - just consider the antics at YNH and The Intersection.

This really is an impossible and incoherent position. I'm not going to tell them to shut up, however (that's their line). No, I'm just going to keep pointing it out, whether they like it or not, and in whatever tone I choose to adopt. That, I think, is my right.

Incidentally, it's ironic here, that YNH complains about being told to shut up, on a site calculated to shut up new atheists:

If you were aiming to shut up and silence an individual trying to express his opinion by digging deep for personal information and not caring what collateral damage you leave along the way in the form of incorrect allegations, you've succeeded.

Well, I certainly don't want YNH to shut up, but there are justifiable reasons for folk wanting to know who an anonymous blogger is who's telling them to how to behave. There's always a suspicion of ulterior motives; it's useful to know where someone is coming from, since it backs up their opinions and gives them some colour. It's not vital to know, but can be helpful. Imagine if YNH was simply a blog set up by churchmen to sow dissent amongst the atheist community? That would be pertinent. Not that that would ever happen, of course.

But this is really a ridiculous diversion from the everyday battle to promote rationalism in the public sphere. Nevertheless, as long as we are wired as we are, some of us will go off on irrational tangents. Here's hoping William at You're Not Helping will see the error of his ways one day.

UPDATE: Gurdur, another prominent accommodationist, clearly spots the problem that YNH exposes; one cannot demand folk behave according to certain rules whilst one flouts the very rules one demands. This first commenter, defending YNH says:

He may have conducted himself badly, but it does not diminish the validity of the message.

Let me just complete that sentence to highlight its asininity:

He may have conducted himself badly, but it does not diminish the validity of the message that one mustn't conduct oneself badly.

Sigh.

FURTHER UPDATE: A full and frank (?) apology has been made for the conduct of YNH by William. I confess it comes over a little too neat for my liking, but others are giving him the benefit of the doubt. It is only teh interwebz, so let's consign it to history and experience.

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Why Public Sex Bans are Wrong

Steve Zara has posted a thought-provoking article, entitled Why Burqa bans are wrong, discussing bans recently introduced by the French government and some other parts of Europe. I confess to being not completely convinced of the ban's rightness or wrongness, although I lean towards it being right. Many good points are made by him and other anti-banners, citing civil liberties, impracticality, discrimination and silliness. I agree with them!

But that's not to say that these points make a ban wrong, just that any ban must be justified. Societies do ban things, so a knee-jerk libertarian response is not appropriate, though there are civil liberty concerns to weigh. Steve also notes that the real problem of wearing the burqa is that it is '...ill-mannered and disrespectful to others in society'. This is a good observation, but not the *most* problematic thing about it, in my opinion, when it is a cultural *imposition*. So I thought I would compare burqa wearing with public sex, after spotting this story about a cargo cult in Papua New Guinea, who decided that sex would deliver more bananas (I don't scour the web for stories about sex cults, and anyone who says I do is a liar!). A few quotes:

The Banana Cult is headed by a man from Yamine village.
The man and his followers have been engaged in illicit public sex for the past four months and have forced other villagers under threat of violence to participate.
(...)
According to Mr Namusa (village elder), the villagers resorted to cult activities, claiming the government had forgotten them. Mr Namusa said the cultists believed that their banana fruit would multiply 10-fold every time they had sex in public.
(...)
Mr Namusa confirmed the cult movement and said young men and women including married couples were walking around naked and having sex in public places
without being ashamed of themselves.

So to paraphrase Steve's first paragraphs:

Doesn't seeing people having sex in public make you feel uneasy? It makes me feel uneasy. It makes very many people feel uneasy, so uneasy that in several places in Europe there are laws against public sex either on the books or being planned. Such laws are dangerous, and unnecessary.
What is the problem with such sex?

I'm sure the analogy doesn't work completely, but, remember; no doubt some of the people indulging in public sex were freely indulging - it's their lifestyle choice. Should we restrict their freedom? On the other hand, many members of the community were cowed by the group dynamic, and some were too young to know any different. Should they be protected?

Don't be silly, one might say, public sex is much more harmful than a mere fashion choice. Perhaps, perhaps not; I just don't know the damage that burqa wearing *actually* causes (nor indeed public sex).

Banning burqa-wearing in public may have the effect of imprisoning women in those cultures. But, likewise, a banana cultist would feel obliged to spend a lot more time shut up inside having sex to ensure their banana deliveries.

There's only a few women who wear the burqa, so it's hardly a widespread problem. But would one allow just a few tens of people having public sex to ensure their banana delivery? I can't see it.

The point is that legislation against practices, such as public sex and public burqa wearing, are not bad per se, and have to be considered on the merits of each case. If the effects of burqa wearing are sufficiently abusive one would *have* to consider introducing such legislation against that abuse.

Now I don't *think* that burqa wearing is as unwelcome as public sex, although I'm not too sure what harm to society *either* brings! As I say, *I just don't know*. But there is, at the very least, a clear case of potential abuse with 'extreme' clothing that should be assessed, to avoid harbouring a community of abused women. And I don't see that a ban, any ban, can be dismissed out of hand, if it could help to lift the abuse.

Mind you, it would be a good test for Harris's science of morality. If all studies showed communities and women *flourishing* wherever the burqa is worn (I doubt very much that would be the case), what should be the scientific response? Perhaps there might be a need to resort to some Rawlsian primary social goods; or acceptance that we shouldn't be so prescriptive about what is good for people.

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Moral Inscrutability

Russell Blackford has written a good blog post summarising the philosophically-minded objections to Sam Harris's is-ought pseudo-dismissal. I'm basically in agreement with Harris, although note the (valid) objections of a number of philos about the meta-ethics - I just don't think they matter *that* much! But Russell makes a good point when he summarises Harris's argument comparing his putative moral science to medical science:

Unfortunately, we are nowhere near to having the sort of general agreement as to the goals of, well, moralising, if you will, that we do with practising medicine or science. So it's no use arguing:

P1. The ultimate goals of medicine and science are contestable
P2. We can practice medicine and science with no terrible difficulty.
C. We can, with no terrible difficulty, practice anything whose ultimate goals are contestable.
Hence, we can, with no terrible difficulty, practice a "science of morality".

The correct conclusion, at "C.", is that we can, with no terrible difficulty, practice some things whose ultimate goals are contestable. As far as this argument goes, whether morality is one of those things is left as an open question. It really depends on just how much debate there is about a practice's ultimate goals, and how this pans out in practice. Unfortunately, the ultimate goals of morality are so controversial, and so disputed at such a deep level, that it's not surprising when much of what goes on in moral philosophy relates to trying to get agreement on the ultimate goals.

I think this is right, at a foundational level. However, Russell agrees that applying ethics is something that can be done:

But Harris doesn't actually need to make an unheralded breakthrough in metaethics to establish his main point about the possibility and desirability of criticising moral systems. If those moral systems are harmful to human wellbeing ... then criticise them for it! I think hammers exist to drive nails and that it's approximately correct to say that moral systems exist to conduce to human wellbeing and, to some extent, the wellbeing of other sentient creatures.

And of course each society establishes a way of living that announces their conception of the best morality - it would be disingenuous to suggest otherwise.

The meta-ethical problems arise, it seems to me, from the inscrutable origins of our morality. Because we have evolved in the environment according to events that are impossible to retrodict, let alone predict, we find it very difficult to determine the cause of every animal's every trait. The morality we have (signs of which appear in other mammals) has been a necessary development for our survival, or is a consequence of another feature that was necessary for our survival. But it's still just a *feeling*, so consequently isn't an *infallible* guide to what is right for us. It's not a bad starting point, but because many think they have nothing else to go on, they trust their 'gut' feeling over all else.

The religious turn morality's *fallibility* (observed empirically) and turn it into *arbitrariness*. To bolster their flagging confidence in 'what is right', they invest a God with good and call it absolute and objective. Much analysis down the years has yet to show that this approach is tenable or, indeed, plausible. One would think that a good-invested God might have an effect substantially different from an evil-invested God, but it's difficult to see how either could result in the universe we have.

The rationalist can accept that we have a sense of what is good without it being absolute, so tempers it with a good dose of reason and evidence; like everything else in life.

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Catholic Post-modernism

A useful post, by Simon Rowney of Cathnews, as an example of the sort of witless rambling that the intertubes facilitates. I'm of the opinion that the more free speech and transparency for ideas in the public sphere the better, and the internet supplies that in spades. So, the theory goes, idiocy will be exposed, and the human project will progress *more* rationally. Hopefully. It's possible, however, that it allows foolishness to be spread as quick if not quicker than before, so the theory may be wrong. Consider this nonsense:

Modern people believe philosophy is a private and personal encounter with truth. Ever since the publication of Descartes' Meditations each person has been forced to answer the fundamental questions alone. This paradox holds true, despite the fact that Science, much like Christianity, is very public and has a definite creed.

I'm not too sure what this means; perhaps he's commenting on the inevitable problem we humans have as prisoners of our own perceptions; certainly Descartes' cogito ergo sum points us in that direction. But one can easily fall into solipsism, which hardly gets the Catholic anywhere. If one isn't solipsistic, then, by definition, one isn't *forced* to answer the fundamental questions alone. No, one has fellow travellers, and tools to help. (And of course, science does not have a *creed* but a methodology.)

Because of this, in the modern world it is considered a grave error to question another person's rationality. By all means we are invited to proclaim truth and critically appraise the validity of arguments. However we cannot, under any circumstances, question another's rationality.

This is so laughable one is attempted to call Poe. What would be the point of not pointing out someone's irrationality? Or is he saying no-one's really irrational?Are we really expected never to question someone's rationality? Where does that leave the courts, who have to decide on the competence of defendants? Are we not expected to call Harold Shipman and Christie mad? This really is the height of stupidity, let alone irrationality. It's clear to me that what the writer is talking about is not modernism, but post-modernism.

Dawkins assumes that all educated people will reach the same conclusions!

No. He's well aware that educated people reach different conclusions. That evidence is all around us. Why is science such an important methodology? Because it acknowledges this truth and counters it.

In the modern world proclaiming public and definite truths has special difficulties. Dawkins and many spokespeople for science are not even aware these difficulties exist. They move forward in blissful ignorance of their fundamental myopia.

On the contrary, in my experience they are well aware of the problems that proclamations of definite truths can be. Truth in science, as opposed to logic for example, is always contingent. In this it stands in stark opposition to the bold absolute assertions of the dogmatically religious.

The Church, on the other hand, is acutely aware of the modern challenge. She is equally aware that personal philosophy can strengthen Faith and create opportunities for evangelization. In large part the Church's view has been the happy result of Cardinal Newman's influence. Through the life and writings of this thoroughly modern man, the Church has come to understand and embrace the extraordinary interplay between a personal philosophy and a public creed.

It's ironic indeed that the Catholics are beatifying Newman, who appears to have been a very devout man whose very nature is denied as natural by his Church, and was buried with his lifelong partner Ambrose St. John. Interesting indeed to consider how the personal and the public 'interplayed' for him. But however pious and wise is a person does not make them right in all matters, and for that reason, personal philosophy is nothing more than a useful contribution to the human project. The root of much evil in the world is to reify one's own personal philosophy and present it as fact. This could be the definition of the religious.

Rowney wants to discredit science through a post-modern dismissal of all rational analysis, which allows him to maintain his foul prejudices (and of course everyone else theirs). So we begin to see a coalition of forces in defence of irrationality, made up of the devout and the credulous, demanding an unthinking *respect* for any crackpot idea. That way, they can get a free pass for their favourite crackpot idea.

Now the danger here is that many people have rather *disreputable* crackpot ideas, which they are keen to impose in the public sphere, to satisfy their own prejudices and benefit themselves. Rowney's argument is the perfect justification for *any* ideology. By his own logic a church set up with a mission statement to eliminate all Roman Catholics could not be condemned as irrational. Well, unlike him, I *would* question the rationality of such people, and would defend everyone's right to question it. More than that, it's vital for the healthy development of our society that we shouldn't stand idly by when we see irrational behaviour, but should condemn it for what it is.

Therefore I question Rowney's rationality, despite not being able to, apparently.

For an example of the irrationality of Catholic dogma, try this.

And a tragic example of the irrationality of another sect here.

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What Clever People Say

Fodor and Piatelli-Palmarini have replied to a review of their book What Darwin Got Wrong with a letter which includes this:

Our difficulty with Darwin is very like our difficulty with our stockbroker. He says the way to succeed on the market is to buy low and sell high, and we believe him. But since he won’t tell us how to buy low and sell high, his advice does us no good. Likewise, Darwin thinks that the traits that are selected-for are the ones that cause fitness; but he doesn’t say how the kinds of variables that his theory envisages as selectors could interact with phenotypes in ways that distinguish causes of fitness from their confounds. This problem can’t be solved by just stipulating that the traits that are selected for are the fitness-enhancing traits; that, as one said in the 1960s, isn’t the solution; it’s the problem.

I cannot understand how clever people can get themselves into such a state. This is an argument against everything, as far as I can tell. Darwin isn't advising *how* to buy low and sell high. Otherwise he would be omniscient. He's identifying the mechanism. As is the stockbroker. Here's some news, for the slow of learning; stockbrokers don't know exactly *how*. Otherwise they'd all be multi-billionaires. Sometimes they get it right. The good ones get it right more than others. Nature gets it right because it has no alternative; it's what happens! But Darwin can't pre-figure it. Just because he can't, doesn't invalidate the mechanism, any more than the stockbroker getting it wrong does. Once again, that science doesn't know all the answers, doesn't invalidate it. If it predicted an answer that didn't fit the facts, it would.

This sort of reasoning from professionals baffles me. I wonder how these people get gainful employment.

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The 'New Atheist' Fallacy

There is a flaccid thread of thoughtless commentary on the new atheists these days, exemplified by this self-important diatribe by David B. Hart. Consider the source of his gloom:

The principal source of my melancholy, however, is my firm conviction that today’s most obstreperous infidels lack the courage, moral intelligence, and thoughtfulness of their forefathers in faithlessness.

But there is little new under the sun when it comes to arguments against theism, and the new atheists are using the same arguments as their 'forefathers'; how could it be a source of his melancholy? He carries on in similar vein, mounting various straw men in place of actual new atheist positions, before discussing in tedious detail the problem of infinite regress, which, for some reason, he thinks is the new atheists' favourite argument. One could equally say it's the theists' favourite argument, since that is where the prime mover springs from, but his discussion reaches no conclusion one way or the other, so he agrees with the new atheists! Bizarre. He then babbles on about Nietzsche in even more tedious detail, as if he was the final say on all matters divine.

His problem, as with all faitheists, is to misunderstand the new atheists as absolutist fundamentalists, when, as any fule kno, they are the very opposite; contingent agnostics prepared to admit they're atheists, and to understand the consequences of that admission.

A few quotes from some non-believers:

And, in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of ‘religion,’ which, by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different that those which are used by one man are for the most part ridiculous to another.
(...)
Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared necessary for salvation, there be so many manifestly to the advantage of the Pope and of his spiritual subjects residing in the territories of other Christian princes that, were it not for the mutual emulation of those princes, they might without war or trouble exclude all foreign authority as easily as it had been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see to whose benefit it conduceth to have it believed that a king hath not his authority from Christ unless a bishop crown him? That a king, if he be a priest, cannot marry? (...) That the clergy and regulars, in what country soever, shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of their king in cases criminal? Or who does not see to whose profit redound the fees of private masses and vales of purgatory, with other signs of private interest enough to mortify the most lively faith, if, as I said, the civil magistrate and custom did not more sustain it than any opinion they have of the sanctity, wisdom, or probity of their teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of religion in the world to one and the same cause, and that is, unpleasing priests; and those not only amongst Catholics but even in that Church that hath presumed most of reformation.¹

I have often wondered, that persons who make a boast of professing the Christian religion, namely, love, joy, peace, temperance, and charity to all men, should quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display daily towards one another such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the virtues they claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith.²

Hence the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a superstitious piety and devotion: Hence, it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself believe them sincere.³

When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.⁴

I am thus one of the very few examples, in this country, of one who has, not thrown off religious belief, but never had it: I grew up in a negative state with regard to it. I looked upon the modern exactly as I did upon the ancient religion, as something which in no way concerned me. It did not seem to me more strange that English people should believe what I did not, than that the men I read of in Herodotus should have done so.⁵

Given, a man with moderate intellect, a moral standard not higher than the average, some rhetorical affluence and great glibness of speech, what is the career in which, without the aid of birth or money, he may most easily attain power and reputation in English society? Where is that Goshen of mediocrity in which a smattering of science and learning will pass for profound instruction, where platitudes will be accepted as wisdom, bigoted narrowness as holy zeal, unctuous egoism as God-given piety? Let such a man become an evangelical preacher; he will then find it possible to reconcile small ability with great ambition, superficial knowledge with the prestige of erudition, a middling morale with a high reputation for sanctity.⁶

Gentlemen [believers], we can only reply, wait till you have some show of agreement amongst yourselves. Wait till you can give some answer not palpably a verbal answer, to some one of the doubts which oppress us as they oppress you. Wait till you can point to some single truth, however trifling, which has been discovered by your method, and will stand the test of discussion and verification. Wait till you can appeal to reason without in the same breath vilifying reason. Wait till your Divine revelations have something more to reveal than the hope that the hideous doubts which they suggest may possibly be without foundation. Till then we shall be content to admit openly, what you whisper under your breath or hide in technical jargon, that the ancient secret is a secret still; that man knows nothing of the Infinite and Absolute; and that, knowing nothing, he had better not be dogmatic about his ignorance. And, meanwhile, we will endeavour to be as charitable as possible, and whilst you trumpet forth officially your contempt for our skepticism, we will at least try to believe that you are imposed upon by your own bluster.⁷

There will always be a fungus, a star, or a disease that human science does not know of; and for this reason it must always behove the philosopher, in the name of the undying ignorance of man, to deny every miracle and say of the most startling wonders,-the host of Bolsena, the star in the East, the cure of the paralytic and the like : Either it is not, or it is; and if it is, it is part of nature and therefore natural.⁸

The pulpit assures us that wherever we see suffering and sorrow which we can relieve and do not do it, we sin, heavily. There was never yet a case of suffering or sorrow which God could not relieve. Does He sin, then? If He is the Source of Morals He does - certainly nothing can be plainer than that, you will admit. Surely the Source of law cannot violate law and stand unsmirched; surely the judge upon the bench cannot forbid crime and then revel in it himself unreproached.⁹

It is not well worthy of note that of all the multitude of texts through which man has driven his annihilating pen he has never once made the mistake of obliterating a good and useful one? It does certainly seem to suggest that if man continues in the direction of enlightenment, his religious practice may, in the end, attain some semblance of human decency.¹⁰

Do not all theists insist that there can be no morality, no justice, honesty or fidelity without the belief in a Divine Power? Based upon fear and hope, such morality has always been a vile product, imbued partly with self-righteousness, partly with hypocrisy.¹¹

Throughout the last 400 years, during which the growth of science had gradually shown men how to acquire knowledge of the ways of nature and mastery over natural forces, the clergy have fought a losing battle against science, in astronomy and geology, in anatomy and physiology, in biology and psychology and sociology. Ousted from one position, they have taken up another. After being worsted in astronomy, they did their best to prevent the rise of geology; they fought against Darwin in biology, and at the present time they fight against scientific theories of psychology and education. At each stage, they try to make the public forget their earlier obscurantism, in order that their present obscurantism may not be recognized for what it is.
(...)
Toplady, the author of "Rock of Ages," moved from one vicarage to another; a week after the move, the vicarage he had formerly occupied burnt down, with great loss to the new vicar. Thereupon Toplady thanked God; but what the new vicar did is not known.
(...)
I am sometimes shocked by the blasphemies of those who think themselves pious-for instance, the nuns who never take a bath without wearing a bathrobe all the time. When asked why, since no man can see them, they reply: "Oh, but you forget the good God." Apparently they conceive of the Deity as a Peeping Tom, whose omnipotence enables Him to see through bathroom walls, but who is foiled by bathrobes. This view strikes me as curious.
The whole conception of "Sin" is one which I find very puzzling, doubtless owing to my sinful nature. If "Sin" consisted in causing needless suffering, I could understand; but on the contrary, sin often consists in avoiding needless suffering. Some years ago, in the English House of Lords, a bill was introduced to legalize euthanasia in cases of painful and incurable disease. The patient's consent was to be necessary, as well as several medical certificates. To me, in my simplicity, it would seem natural to require the patient's consent, but the late Archbishop of Canterbury, the English official expert on Sin, explained the erroneousness of such a view. The patient's consent turns euthanasia into suicide, and suicide is sin. Their Lordships listened to the voice of authority, and rejected the bill. Consequently, to please the Archbishop-and his God, if he reports truly-victims of cancer still have to endure months of wholly useless agony, unless their doctors or nurses are sufficiently humane to risk a charge of murder. I find difficulty in the conception of a God who gets pleasure from contemplating such tortures; and if there were a God capable of such wanton cruelty, I should certainly not think Him worthy of worship. But that only proves how sunk I am in moral depravity.
(...)
We are told that sin consists in acting contrary to God's will. This, however, does not get rid of the difficulty. Those who, like Spinoza, take God's omnipotence seriously, deduce that there can be no such thing as sin. This leads to frightful results. What! said Spinoza's contemporaries, was it not wicked of Nero to murder his mother? Was it not wicked of Adam to eat the apple? Is one action just as good as another? Spinoza wriggles, but does not find any satisfactory answer. If everything happens in accordance with God's will, God must have wanted Nero to murder his mother; therefore, since God is good, the murder must have been a good thing. From this argument there is no escape.
(...)
As soon as we abandon our own reason, and are content to rely upon authority, there is no end to our troubles. Whose authority? The Old Testament? The New Testament? The Koran? In practice, people choose the book considered sacred by the community in which they are born, and out of that book they choose the parts they like, ignoring the others.
(...)
Self-importance, individual or generic, is the source of most of our religious beliefs. Even sin is a conception derived from self-importance.
(...)
Since evolution became fashionable, the glorification of Man has taken a new form. We are told that evolution has been guided by one great Purpose: through the millions of years when there were only slime, or trilobites, throughout the ages of dinosaurs and giant ferns, of bees and wild flowers, God was preparing the Great Climax. At last, in the fullness of time, He produced Man, including such specimens as Nero and Caligula, Hitler and Mussolini, whose transcendent glory justified the long painful process. For my part, I find even eternal damnation less incredible, and certainly less ridiculous, than this lame and impotent conclusion which we are asked to admire as the supreme effort of Omnipotence. And if God is indeed omnipotent, why could He not have produced the glorious result without such a long and tedious prologue?¹²

Of the proposed solutions of the problem of evil which we have examined, none has stood up to criticism. There may be other solutions which require examination, but this study strongly suggests that there is no valid solution of the problem which does not modify at least one of the constituent propositions in a way which would seriously affect the essential core of the theistic position. Quite apart from the problem of evil, the paradox of omnipotence has shown that God's omnipotence must in any case be restricted in one way or another, that unqualified omnipotence cannot be ascribed to any being that continues through time. And if God and his actions are not in time, can omnipotence, or power of any sort, be meaningfully ascribed to him?¹³

Who are these dreadful , strident, militant new atheists? - you may wonder, if you are a sensitive believer, or believer in belief. They certainly reflect many of the arguments of the current so-called 'new atheists'.

All long dead before the year 2000. So much for New Atheism.

EDIT: And one last quote, this time from a theist:

But I must confess that I am not afraid of the word "tension." I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. - King, M.L. Letter from Birmingham Jail

¹ Hobbes, T. 'Of Religion' from Leviathan.
² de Spinoza, B. Preface to Theological-political Treatise.

³ Hume, D. The Natural History of Religion.

⁴ Hume, D. Of Miracles.

⁵ Mill, J. S. Moral Influences in Early Youth.

⁶ Eliot, G. Evangelical Teaching.

⁷ Stephen, L. An Agnostic's Apology.

⁸ France, A. Miracle from 'Le Jardin d'Epicure' .

⁹ Twain, M. Thoughts of God.

¹⁰ Twain, M. Bible Teaching and Religious Practice.

¹¹ Goldman, E. The Philosophy of Atheism.

¹² Russell, B. An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish.

¹³ Mackie, J. L. Evil and Omnipotence.

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Warning - Priests!

In light of the many revelations of misconduct within the Roman Catholic Church around the world, it is perhaps time for these signs to be placed on the doors of their churches and cathedrals?

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